Human Factors in Decision-Making by Morosov, Y.
Human Factors in Decision-Making
Morosov, Y.
IIASA Working Paper
WP-77-013
1977 
Morosov, Y. (1977) Human Factors in Decision-Making. IIASA Working Paper. WP-77-013 Copyright © 1977 by the 
author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/721/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
ｈｕｾｾｎ FACTORS IN DECISION-MAKING
Yuri Morosov
October 1977 ｾ ｶ ｐ Ｍ Ｗ Ｗ Ｍ Ｑ Ｓ
Working Papers are internal publications intended for circulation within the
Institute onJy. Opinions or views contained herein are solely those of the
author.
2361 IｾＺｘｳ･ｴｲｾＺｊＺｲｧ International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis

HUMAN FACTORS IN DECISION-MAKING
1. Two Types of Decision-Making
The important role of decisions in the whole process of
management on all the levels is unquestionable now.
In practical work every manager in business deals with
decisions devoted both to so-called "technico-ecnnoroic"
business and ",management" decisions in the proper sense of the
word where the latter reflects the essence of the management,
its role in coordination and organization,the management itself
(where the former are the decisions which deal with the object
of management). The best sign of the management decision is
the presence of the feature of coordinating the activity of
people to achieve the goal (which, of course, does not mean
that the managerial decisions deal only with "collective"
decisions in the Luse-Raiffa meaning1 a director's decision to
promote someone is an individual management decision (see
Chapters 13 and 14 in [1]).
The distinction between the former and the latter is not
purely a linguistic one. Due to many reasons the main efforts
were directed to the "optimal" techno-economic decisions: this
can be represented in the well-known form:
(x)
t= X
extr
But those well-structured problems mainly tackle technical
problems, in which (a) the human and organizational factors play
subordinate roles; (b) the statement of the problem is defined
by the problem itself (criteria--for instcnce, minimum time,
cost, etc.). In such a statement obviously the traditional
stages of managerial decisions process (analysis of the present
situation, the description of a set of alternatives, the state-
ment of goals and criteria, the assessment of alternatives) are
omitted. The main difference between the managerial and techno-
economic decisions is not in fact that the latter can often be
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represented in a formal (equational) form (this advantage can
easily be explained if one takes into consideration the fact
that attention to the managerial decisions was drawn later than
to the techno-economical ones. The main difference is that there
is no real choice between the alternatives in techno-economic
decisions: in those problems we have no choice, but search for
a ｰｯｴ･ｮｴｩｾｬｬｹ existing decision (which is not the case with
managerial decisions).
As a whole, techno-economic problems deal with the first
five functions of a manager (according to Fayol): technical,
financial, control and maintenance, but not with organizational
functions. It is well-known that the techno-economic problems
("standard") constitute 75% of all decisions made by a manager
which is why the skill to resolve these problems as well as
possible, is a step forward, but it does not mean that we should
deal only with them.
From some point of view pure managerial problems are much
more interesting due to the fact that (i) in them the criteria
and restrictions are not defined beforehand, that must be done
in the process of decision making; (ii) it is very difficult
to make them formalized; (iii) as a rule they have a lot of
criteria; (iv) as a rule, "fuzziness" and bad defined terms
are characteristic of them; and the most important (v) the
decision must be made in an organization, from which the
existence of different interests, different understanding and
interpretation of measures, activities and goals, (which must
be achieved in the result of decision making) follows.
Therefore we consider it necessary to study (a) the
process of decision-making in real life organizations, (b)
factors (human and organizational) which influence it, (c)
collective and individual decisions in them, and (d) interpre-
tation, communication and motivation in organizations. We
should use methods of such sciences like psychology, sociology,
social psychology to do so.
These problems became so urgent now, when we try (and
which is more imporant, have) to use computers in man-machine
systems for improvement of management. This cooperation becomes
impossible if we do not know how man and man-made organizations
make decisions (see [2]). This knowledge will help us to settle
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techno-economic problems too--the fact is that when we try to
introduce into the statement of them such things like multi-
criteria, dynamics, uncertainty, etc--we do it following the
advice of existing methods, which are based only on mathemati-
cal conveniences, not on the essence of the tasks. (It is
interesting to point out that the last 25% of "non standard"
decisions determine the main variables, which influence consi-
derably the life of an organization--goals, criteria, norms
and moral standards in it, personnel policy, communication
structure in it, etc.).
2. Continuous Decisions
There exists another very important distinction between
the two kinds of problems. The management decision process
consists of two parts: the search (formulation) for the decision
and the work on its implementation (because the work on the imple-
mentation of techno-economic decisions is an organizational one).
But both the decisions found in the scientific institute or made
by the manager himself, when implemented, usually (someone
thinking that always) have nothing in common with the proposed
one: during the process of adjustment it may change greatly.
We consider the underestimation of the implementation stage
and' the men and organizations which act on it, to be the main
reason for this "gap" between made and implemented ､ ｾ ｣ ｩ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ Ｎ
To eliminate this gap we feel it necessary to consider
the decision-making process as a continuous process of searching
and implementation of the decision. This means that we should
take into consideration the "internal parameters II of t,he o;-gani-
zations and managers, the collaboration and communication of
men and organizations (which in practice sometimes may mean
simply the participation of those who implement decision in
the process of their elaboration). To some extent the existing
methods of decision preparation (talks, meetings, collective and
even open discussion on alternatives, preparation of drafts,
visas, signatures, etc.) try (based on the experience of managers)
to overcome the gap by means of the development of special pro-
cedures (strict control, personnel policy, good reports, explana-
tion and agitation work, etc.)
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To be able to consider a decision to be "continuous" in
the process of its elaboration and implementation one should
take into consideration not only the social-psychological
parameters of the decision making organization, but also (a)
goals, targets, resources, implementors, (b) time span, (c)
existing rules, instructions, previous decisions on the subject,
and (d) paramters of organizational structure and its cooperation
with informal structure. (Really "continuous" decision should
necessarily include in itself such things, for instance, like:
which acts and instructions must be disabled and which ones must
be prepared, etc.)
Continuous decision will facilitate tying decision and (a)
goals, (b) resources, (c) personnel, (d) time-span, and (e)
existing organizational structures.
Of course, we are far from the statement that the above
mentioned features of continuous decisions are quite new ones
(for example, the idea of participation was discussed in several
places, see [2]). Our main intention j.s to point out that this
intuitively and in practice obvious statement,is considered to
be an art, not an exact science. Nowadays to my mind, we
considerably lack descriptive (not normative) ｴ ｨ ･ ｾ ｾ ｾ of decision-
making, which would be based on real life facts of behavior of
organization and managers in the decision-making process.
3. Psychological Factors of Decision-Making
There is a number of parameters which could be included (or
at least tested) into the decision making theory even now:
a) more realistic description of goal setting of men and
organization (those which prevalent nowadays describe
them like "seeker of maximum profit, utility, etc.--which
in light of the presence of level-of-aspiration-aehievement
behavior lacks solid base);
b) more realistic testing of attitudes towards risk (in the
theory of games and in statistical inferences man ig
considered to be an absolutely "rational being") even the
ｳ ｩ ｭ ｰ ｾ ･ usage of three types of risk aversion gave interesting
results (see [3]);
c) logic of decision must be built which (unlike the works of
Rescher or Wright) should take into account such facts like
A1.
A2.
A3.
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intransitivity of preferences, incomplete order of
alternatives, etc.;
d) time of perception and processing of information by
collectives and men;
e) level of unity of groups or organization (presence of
leader, kind of his authority, socioeconometric chart
of the group, distribution of power between deviants
and conformists, etc.);
f) emotions and affections, which now are considered to be
a good assistance to a man in decision making under un-
certainty (see [4]); and
g) principal inability for a man to imagine infinite (and
even very large number) of alternatives at a time and
"fuzzyll character of his thinking.
4. Model of Individual Decision-Making
Modeling life is a good and useful method of studying it,
and therefore we will try to present here some models of man's
behavior in decision-making situations which will explain at
least some of the phonomena mentioned earlier.
Let us consider a set of Ilfinite ll lotteries M (in von
Neuman-Morgenstern's sense [5]): ApB, such that: if A and B
in M, then ApB eEL M also (where 0" p <. 1 and ApB means lottery:
to have A with a probability p or B with a probability 1-p).
Let us assume:
On M exists a linear, reflexive, transitive order ｾ •
If A>B, then for all ｏ ｾ ｰ Ｂ Ｑ A>ApB)b
If A> B) C, then there exists p that 0 ｾ p" 1 and B NApC.
A1-A3 were included, with a number of others, into a set
of axioms in von Neurnan-Morgenstern's work. They insured the
existence of the utility function on M, because from them one
could infer that in A3, p must be unique. But from A1-A3 we can
not make this inference, that is there can exist a whole interval
p = [P1' P2] such that for any p£P, ApC "'" B. This reflects the
fact that any man cannot discriminate all the alternatives and/or
numbers. This improvement makes impossible the inference of a
Ilnormalll utility function, but we succeeded in constructing a
Ilfuzzy" utility function U: M-+6(E), where U now maps a set of
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alternatives not on the real numbers line E, but on the (con-
structively built) set of intervals E (see [6] for details) .
It is easy to notice that u(x) is really "fuzzy" in the Zadeth
meaning.
From such a model we have some interesting conclusions.
Let us introduce now the order on M in the following way:
B1. A> *B ｾ ｦ Ｌ and only if, A ｾ Band U(A) fl U(B) = 'S..
B2. A rv*B if, and only if, U(A) f\ U (B) 1= "Q.
The newly constructed order ｾ Ｊ , though symmetric and
reflexive, is not transitive, which shows a possible way to
explain why in real life, man often behaves "irrationally." In
our previous paper, we showed the way to solve Allays paradox [7]
using a fuzzy utility function. 1
5. Model of Group Decision-Making
Another part of the future work might be the modeling of the
decision-making process in organizations, which was described in
a number of works, one of the most famous being Arrow's work on
collective choice [8]. The main result of this was: decisions
in organizations either depend on only one man ("dictatorship"],
or independent ("imposed"). It seems to us that the reason for
this disappointing results was that the basic assumptions about
the human's and organization's behavior were too far from reality--
they did not take into account the real mechanism of coordination
of the interests in groups: role of leader, influence of the
group on its members (which was discovered in Sherif's experi-
ments [9] and confirmed in a series of other and different
countries), etc.
The most primitive model of a leader's influence on the
group decision-making might be stated as follows: let P. (x)
1
be the probability that alternative x from M is the "best" for
member i of the group. Let us describe two classical cases:
'It is necessary to point out that in our opinion the main
cause for the utility function being "fuzzy" is not the un-
certainty of the information (because the target can, and
ｭ ｾ ｳ ｴ Ｌ be stated clearly) but is due to the existence of many
d:fferent goals, which a manager or an organization pursues
slmultaneously.
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(a) for some members i there exists a utility function .for the
ｰ ｲ ･ ｦ ･ ｲ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ ｾ ｩ on M; then it is quite natural to assume, that
u. (x) > u. (y) if, and only if p .. (x) > p. (y);
1 1 1 1
(b) member i has a level of aspiration ｵ ｾ (that means that for all
1
x 1 , x 2 €｛ｵＯｵｻｘＩｾｕＡＱ = A, x 1 ---i x 2 ' and if X1€A, X2 t!-A,
then x 1 > i x 2 )· In this case Pi{x) will be part linear one.
{Of course usually we should not expect the occurence of both
cases (a) and (b).
Then the process of decision-making will be described in
two staged procedure: first step--every one has his own
judgements, and compares them with the group's and with (parti-
cularly) the leader's preferences. The second step--adjust-
ment of members' preferences {Pi (x) to leaders: Pi (x) becomes
pi{x) = f{p .(x)i Pio{x» where i
o
is leader (it is worth trying
Pio • Pi instead of f, or some other function).
6. Critique of Some Models of Decision-Making
Different models, describing human decision-making, were
prepared by a lot of authors (see review in [1]). Their
assumptions may be stated as follows:
a) decision-maker seeks optimum of utility index;
b) decision-maker is considered to be only one "being"
(which means in case of organizations, that we omit or
consider to be irrelevant such things as discrepancy
of interests of different men, communicational problems,
etc.); and
c) all the problems can be stated in "strict" terms (especially
quantified) .
Let us consider some of these models:
(1) A model describing a man who seeks "max imum expected
utility" was proposed by J. Bermulli, which states that in the
situation with uncertain outomes rational men must choose a
strategy with the maximum expected utility of gain. Well-known
Sanct-Peterbourgh Paradox was the first example, which showed
that in real situation a man decides whether to take part in the
game or not but the price of it is less than the expected utility.
(Moreover, this price is chosen not in a pick-and-toss way, because
the prices, defined by different people, turned out to be very close
to each other.) That means, that there must exist other principles
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describing man's behavior in decision-making processes. In a
number of situations two strategies might have equal expected
utilities, but one might be obviously better than the other
(for example, the dispersion of one might be less). Therefore
we should take into consideration not only the expected utility
but, and this is much more important, we should firstly decide
whether we can use statistical functions at all because we must
know what kind of probability we consider--subjective or logical
probabilities might turn out to be more adequate while decribing
real behavior. The fact is that those problems which we described
above as "managerial", occur very seldom (H. Simon calls them
"unprogrammed") and therefore it is impossible to find any
statistical functions (because a situation does not repeat itself).
Even the simple consideration of risk aversion violates
the maximum expected utility principles. Let us assume a man
estimates the outcome x of a game u(x) = (x-4)2. Let us assume
a game:L= [$+10 with probability 0,5
$-2 with probability 0,5
The expected gain from the participation is $4 (= 10/2 - 2/2)
which means that the utility of participation is zero: u(4) = O.
But the expected utility of gain is 36 (= 0.5 • (-2-4)2 + 0,5. (10-4)2)
which means that a man will prefer to run a risk and take part in
the game L sooner than receive a "sure" $4.
Let us consider the application of the fuzzy utility function
mentioned above to expected utility principle. Let A1 ., A2 > A3 ;
from A1-A3 follows that there exists R = ｛ｾ ; r], such that for
all ｲ ｾ R, A2NA1 r A3 (win A1 with probability rand A3 with
(1-r)). Natural generalization of Bermully's principle on a case
of fuzzy measurements would have the following form:
(*) u (A 2 ) = r u (A 1 ) + (1-r) u (A3 )
(**) u (A2 ) = r u (A 1) + (1-r) u (A3 )
where u(A.) = [u(A.); U A.)] - interval of real numbers line.
1 - 1 1
It is easy to show that if we already have U(A2 ) and u(A3 )
then to find ｾ Ｈ ａ ｝ Ｉ and U(A 1 ) from (*) and (**) might have no
sense. For example, it might turn out to be ｾ Ｈ ａ Ｑ Ｉ U(A 1), that
is, alternative A1 was maped by function u on null-set which is
impossible. This means that in case of fuzzy measurements
Bermulli's principle lacks proof.
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(2) Another type of model is the usage of utility function, derived
from preferences on set of alternatives M. If M is topoligical
space, the follwing theorem is true:
Theorem (see [10]). If M connected and separable topological
space with linear, transitive, antireflexive order 7 , then there
exists a utility function "Un such that: U(x) ｾ U(y) if, and only
if x> y (Another kind of of theorem was proven by Debreu, Rader,
etc.) But for vector ordered space which are usually used in
economic models, another situation takes place:
Theorem (for proof see [6]). If M is an ordered vector space
with a "strict" order (no equivalence is allowed) for which
the Axiom of Archimedus is false, then there does not exist any
utility function.
That means that for any Eucledean space with usual topology
(born by metric) there exists no utility function for a "strict"
order. If we still want to deal with it (for instance in the
case of a model of production of, say, goods) we should use the
so-called "equivalence curves", (that is, a set of goods which
are not prefered to each other). It is obvious that doing this
well we would be able to construct a utility function (this
procedure simply means that Archimed Axion is now true).
If we consider Ramsey's problem, the maximization of cumula-
tive consumption over an infinite time horizon U(c) ］ ｾ ｵ Ｈ ｣ Ｌ ｴ Ｉ ､ ｴ Ｌ
we can notice that it is actually a problem of finding the best
c(t) , the consumption strategy from a set C = ｛｣ＨｴＩＯ｣ＨｴＩｾ o}
where time t can be either continuous (and then C is a subset
of vector space of infinite dimension) or discrete (then C is
a subset of Eucledean space of finite dimension). From the
theorem mentioned above follows that if we want to construct
U(c), - utility function, on C, we must artificially introduce
"equivalent curves" which we consider to have no foundations at
all.
(3) In a number of works a model based on the assumption that
a man in a decision-making position behaves so that if he does
not know the exact values of the parameters of the problem under
consideration, it is useful for him to choose a strategy which--
with any realization of the parameters (with unknown probabili-
ties)--minimize the possible loss resulting from the man"s action.
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This is called the II minimax ll principle. This assumes that a
man assesses losses higher than gains. But (and it has often
been pointed out) there do not exist many people who would
always pursue this overcautious strategy; as usual, man's
behavior is a mixture of risk and caution, which enables him
to survive and shows in different situations more or less the
level of risk aversion.
The drawbacks of this model are visible in situations where
there is a big gap in absolute values between losses and gains;
in these cases the minimax rule leads to absurd results. In
a number of cases the statistical minimax estimation was worse
than the estimation found with the help of the usual statistical
methods, as Savage points out in IIFoundations of Statistics. II
We should note that in some works it was stated that the
minimax principle is not a normative principle, but is descriptive.
Let us consider the system of axioms proposed by Vilkas [11].
Let F be the real function on M, a set of all finite-dimension
matrices such that:
C1.
(1) (2)
If A1 and A2 from M and for all i and j, then a .. ｾ a ..1.J 1.J
is, b .. = f(a .. )).1.J 1.J
comparison
then F (A1 ) ｾ F (A 2 ) •
C2. If A is A with one more added row, which does not exceed
any convex linear combination of rows of A, then F(A) = F(A).
C2 1 • If A is A with one more added row, which is not less than
""any convex linear combination of rows of A, then F(A) = F(A).
C3. If AT is transparent A, then F(-AT) = -F(A).
C4. Becuase any real number x is a matrix dimension 1x1, then
F (x) ｾ x for all x.
C4 1 • F(x) = x for any x.
Theorem. F(A) which satisfied C1, C2, C3 and C4 or C1, C2 1 , C3
and C4 1 is equal to the value of the game based on the minimax
principle (see [11]).
Let us consider the meaning of these axioms. C1 states that
the granted gain will not become less if gains do not become less
in all possible games. Of course, this is only in the case when
we ::lquired information of the inequality ﾣ ｾ Ｉ Ｎ ｾ ﾣ ｾ Ｉ Ｎ . But in real1.J 1.J
problems it is useful to consider the elements a .. of A to be the1.J
IIvalues" (prices) of some set b .. of objects (that1.J
But if a dimension of A is large enough during the
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elements of A1 and A2 (for C1), values "f" might change greatly.
Of course, someone might say that the computer can compare them
faster. But to my nlind, the description of man's behavior with
the assumption of the computer's existence is useless--in real
problems such as policy-making, management, military problems,
sports, etc., man has to make decisions with uncertainty and
with limited resources (time, money, etc.) in order to aquire
the required information.
But decisions are still made and one can only improve them
by means of acquiring new information. Therefore it is necessary
to study the human decision-making process without assuming that
one can always have all information.
C1 and C2 1 state that obviously "bad" strategies could be
excluded beforehand. But all these restrict the set of all
possible strategies a priori, and one can note that C2 and C2 1
are "masked" minimax rule (they are well-known in the theory
of games as rules of omitting dominant row or column).
C3 expressed the antagonism of players in a matrix game
and shows that gains of both are inequal in absolute values
and opposite in sign. But as shown by Savage, such an expression
of antagonism has some drawbacks (and moreover in "games with
nature" the antagonism does not take place, and it was those
games where the minimax rule is applied most often) .
This all infers that the model of decision-making behavior
based on the minimax rule is also a normative model.
CONCLUSION
In the present work we dealt ｾ ｩ ｴ ｨ the problem of taking
into account the human factor in the decision-making process.
We tried to show that at present existing theories of decision-
making use elaborated, sophisticated mathematical tools, (which
comprise only normative theories) and which in a number of situ-
ations lack solid base and cannot help a manager to make
decisions because they omit the human factor completely. We
offered some primitive models of decision-making which can, even
on this level of precision, show the weak points of existing
theories. Of course, a lot of future work is needed to construct
a really descriptive theory of decision-making.
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